因为建议为节约能源把煮好的肉放凉了再放进冰箱，跟同屋的一mm口角。又是那句不知道听了多少遍的话：“我知道你说的是对的，可我就是偏不做”。

我想我应该是没什么救了。我这一生大概就注定是不知道怎么与人沟通了的，而我也完全不想因为这个改变自己个性——这也注定大概做研究是唯一适合我的工作。就像中国人没什么救了，注定衰败一样。就像人类没什么救了，注定自我毁灭一样。

mm说我高高在上的论调让她受不了。我想来想去也不知道是哪句话让她这么想。我唯一清楚记得的只是我说“这是根本没有必要浪费的电”——这也是我全部所想表达的。再细想想，觉得可能是因为我说什么“地球”“人类”“人类和小虫的比较”之类的东西。

省电跟省钱有什么关系？钱对地球来说算什么？是的，那一点点电的确不算什么，一个人所能节省的也的确微乎其微。可是世界上有60多亿的人。正是因为每个人都持这样的想法，地球才会像现在这么肮脏。

生命的意义在于生存和繁衍。人类的生命，也逃不过这密码编成的使命。可这些，任何一只在人类眼中渺小的虫子，都不会比人类做得差。而人类却使用着，在比例上，远远多于任何生物所用的能源。从这个角度说——在和地球保持良好互动的作用上，人类实际上是整个地球最低级的生物。抹杀掉99.99%的人类只会让这个地球变得更美丽；而抹杀掉99.99%的小虫，整个地球的生物圈可能陷入崩溃。而最脆弱的，很可能正是处于生物链金字塔顶端的人类。

实际上，节不节省能源，跟地球没有关系；最大关系的是人类自己。（当然，所有其他生物，都因为人类这单一物种的自私行为，而遭受波及。但这当然不会在人类的考虑之内。）人类暂时还没有力量大到能毁灭地球的程度——毁灭的只是人类自己。地球能够把单细胞聚合成人类，就不在乎多玩一次这样的游戏。

人类这个低级的物种，从始至终都被，由自己身体合成，却不明白其如何相互作用发挥功能，的一些化学物质所操控着，永远只以自己的想法为出发点。“我知道你说的是对的，可我就是偏不做”这样的想法除了对个体来说重要，对地球有任何意义么？可问题是，由这样想法产生的个体的行动，却影响着整个地球，整个生物圈。

人类太自私！这样自私的东西，凭什么出现？

人类现在意识到自己面临的一些可能让自己毁灭的危机，比如全球变暖，于是正在作出一些措施“补救”。补救？狗屎！如果人类光会埋怨制造工艺不够环保，而认识不到真正的自救之道：

降低欲望——只买必需的东西，不幸的是要抵抗那些化学物质，

减少使用——其实很简单，随手关灯，节约用水，不浪费没必要用的能源，

回归简单生活目的——生存和繁衍，

人类终将毁灭。

看到某科学杂志上华丽的人工智能机器人时，一边因抗拒不了化学物质而感到满目绚烂，一边赞叹人类的智慧，一边为人类这种不计后果的行为感到恶心。

或许，人类就是地球上的一支昙花，极度绽放，又极度凋落。这样的话，即使毁灭，也没有什么不能心安的了。

如果是这样的论调让别人觉得高高在上的话，那这又是作为人类的另一悲哀了：可以有神的思想，却不能有神的能力。

我希望我的后代从事政治。政治是一门艺术，一门可以驾驭别人的化学物质，操纵别人的思想的艺术（可惜仅仅限于别人的），一门让别人做自己想做的事，别人还以为是自己的决定的艺术。想要补救人类命运，光有个体思想，不懂如果操纵别人，纯属白搭。我是没戏了。

如果搞不了政治，那就学数学吧，可以从事任何科学学目。躲在做研究这个虚伪的保护之下，至少从精神上鄙视这个肮脏的物种。

如果不做科学，那就学音乐吧。既然没人有懂你，那就摒弃人类的语言。

（想注明下，虽然可能没什么必要。“神的思想”不是在标榜自己，甚至没有丝毫的褒义，只是在说人可以有远远超过自己能力的想法。换句话说，就是能在自己的精神世界里强奸任何东西。）

意识到现在自己越来越往哲学方面发展了。结果是，我越来越孤立于人群——从另一个角度说，也可以是我不正常。

人们害怕改变，害怕新事物，尤其是在他们经验甚至是理解以外的事物。这个事实，很多人都认识到了——当然，更多的人没有意识到。我在好多个不同的地方或场合，听到或看到这样的说法或文字。可惜的是，到现在，我还没接触到有关探讨这个问题的书或文章。我相信肯定有，只不过由于我知识的狭隘，不知道而已。我实 际上很希望看到一些这方面详细的研究，一方面想看看别人或甚至是专家的意见。另一方面我现在很苦恼。我自己一个人靠自己的想法，体会，和亲身经历，去领悟 这些大多数正常人不会去思考的问题，不但倍感孤立，而且苦无出路。下面是两个亲身经历。

前不久看到个付钱参加心理学实验的广告。这类的事很多。人们要做研究，需要有参与者作为研究对象。为了鼓励人们参加，通常会有些什么奖品或直接给钱。我通常 对这种事兴趣并不大。我要做一件事，我通常把能学到东西放第一位（当然，完全学不到东西，能拿到超多钱，也是可以接受的。但这显然不现实）。很多这样研究 是Honours，Master，或PhD的——并不是所有人的研究都设计得很有意义。

不过这次，让我有了点兴趣。不是因为他们给每个参与者200澳元（合1000多RMB）， 而是因为主持这个项目的，一个是副教授，一个是博士。我以为，这很明显是一个正儿八经的研究项目。（这里，我用了“我以为”。它确实是。不过我还有其他的意思。下文自明。）于是我第一个念头，是我能跟他们做一些数据的统计分析。我提供给他们免费的劳力和知识，我得到经验。——这又是我不正常的一个证据了。 有几个人会看到给200澳元的志愿者活动（对于这样的事，200澳元是我见到给得最多的），首先想到的是帮人家分析数据的？

我是个典型的doer。我想到的事，我就能立即去做。我也不发email，也不打电话，直接跑那副教授办公室去见他。去了好几次，一直没人。终于在第四次，见到他了。说明了下情况。很意外，他很高兴我能帮他——一般来说，人们不太愿意把自己辛辛苦苦收集的数据共享给别人的。当天，我就给他讲了2-3个小时的统计课。前两天我们第二次会面，我又给他讲了一个多小时。

我非常意外的发现，拿了博士当了副教授的人，统计知识竟然差到这种地步！他甚至连一些很简单的分析都搞不清什么情况用什么（对于学过统计的人，更详细的说的话，他搞不清什么univariable和multivariable的区别，也不知道ANOVA和repeated measure该怎么正确使用）。他这种情况——从我这次和他的谈话中发现到——源于他根本对统计的一些基础的概念性的东西没搞清楚。例如，到底怎样准确的理解null hypothesis。

他说大家（指他领域的人）都是这么分析的。我有点无语。我开始以为他指所有他看到的发表的文章——这问题就更严重了。但怎么可能，我原来也看到过几篇美国的 研究不同学校，不同班级，不同社会经济地位，对小孩的影响的文章。人家用的很好的分析方法啊。我继续问他。看他的意思，大概是指在UQ这个大学的“大家”。这让我突然觉得UQ好烂啊！这就是世界排名32的大学啊？一些博士教授的人，连最基础的统计概念都搞不清楚，也算是这就是世界排名32的大学？你可以不学纯数学纯统计，而学生物，心理，或别的，但问题是，你要做什么实验，都要靠统计学来分析啊！概念不清，不但得出的分析结果可能错误，而且你一辈子就在那做2-way completely randomized的简单设计的实验，用简单的ANOVA按两下按键就出结果。而且，这位副教授，就连这种最简单的实验，他也会因搞不清概念，而用错分析。

突然很想知道美国英国的大学的人这方面怎么样了。对澳大利亚的水平有点失望了。我说，如果真的很多人都用错分析方法，我们可以合写一篇文章，指出人们用错的 地方，提出正确的方法；他着手心理方面，我做统计方面。我本以为他对这个提议会很兴奋。谁知他一脸无辜的摸了摸头，说他从来没想过写统计的文章。他连尝试的勇气都没有。

我又说，你可以约几个其他的老师一起，比如你们院那个上统计课的老师，大家坐一起讨论下。我也希望听下别人的意见。而不是我在这里跟说得他一个人哑口无言，无从反驳。我也能从这样的过程中，巩固自己对这方面知识的理解。

我不知道他会不会约其他人。我更不知道他最终会不会接受我的说法，改变他分析数据和设计实验的方法。只是在我和他的两次谈话中，我深刻感觉到，他那些旧的东 西，已经在他思想里根深蒂固。他反驳不了我从统计学方面出发的观点和说法；他一直从他个人的经验和直觉的理解去守卫他那残破并摇摆着的旧东西。他一直以来 就是这么被教育的（统计方面），他做研究的环境也都是这么做的，而他现在能当上副教授混得也很好。他似乎没什么理由因为一个一篇文章都还没发表的还是学生的人，改变他这么久的做事方法。

花开两朵，各表一枝。个把月前，几个人房友搬了出去，几个新人搬进来。这本很正常，学生合租的房子嘛。只是新搬进来的两个女生之中的一个，让事情有点不太正常。

我一直在学校忙，面试和挑选将搬进来的人时，我一次都不在家。室友亢奋的说那个女生超正。我于是也亢奋的说，“那就她了”，并脑子里YY一些乱78糟的东西。一直兴奋了好几天，直到见到她人，才知道室友的品位和品味有多烂。人倒不胖，但那张脸简直惨不忍睹——整个世界的怨念似乎都集中在这里。我顿时像皮球上扎了个洞般，“噗”的就瘪了气。算了，反正我整天在学校，也见不到。

可是我错了。从她搬进来起，问题就不断出现。先是厨房的清洁问题。开始大家以为女生会比男生干净，会帮忙打扫。哪知她老是带个比她怨念还重的男的回来—— “老”到那男就像住这儿的程度。两个人把吃的用的堆了两桌。然后还总在家做饭，做了也不清盘子。听说她不工作，靠吃政府给大学生的补助过活。

这倒也没什么，年轻人可以理解。可后来，我发现我放冰箱的食物不断的被人取用。我现在在人家女生公寓混饭吃，本来就不需要买很多的食物。于是，被人取用的， 比我自己用的还快。我习惯堆一些吃的在那。比如一块巧克力，我有可能几个月都吃不完。这就有点不太对了。因为随意取用人家东西的行为，不应该是正常的行为。东西倒并不值太多钱，但是很烦人——我总不能老买来给别人吃吧。

再后来，更不好的事发生了。一天早上，我被一阵吵架和打闹声惊醒。我意识还模模糊糊的，只听到有撞击木板“通通”的声音（我家是木头房），撞木墙啊，木门啊。又有一男一女大声的吵架声，互相骂粗话。尤其是那男的，一连的带超级重读的F开头的词，听得让人心惊胆战。接着女的跑到马路上，在那骂街。我既听不清，也听不懂她在说什么。我家一出门，对面就是一所小学，左边是一所幼儿园。我希望那些孩子们和邻居们不要听到这些。女的不知道骂了多久，大概骂累了，就冲回房间哭——就在我隔壁。

从那以后，这样类似的吵架，骂人，哭声，就时时上演。他们说那女的带回来的男的是她前男朋友——我倒没看出来这个“前”字体现在哪里。那男的是做木匠的，可以很明显看出没受过多少教育，也没受过较好的教育。从那以后，我开始对这两个人感到恐惧。每次碰到他们，我都认为我见到的是不详的化身，会带给我灾难。

在被偷吃东西和吵架持续了一段时间后——事实上，我用屁眼都能猜出是他们两个偷的，我发了几封email给我家那个唯一签下整个房子合同的室友。（说明下，他也是学生，虽然住得最久，但也是被迫签下房子。如果没人签合同，所有人都得滚蛋。他并不是二房东。所有 人分摊房租的。）那个室友也肯定东西是他们偷吃的，说他们两个吸大麻，吸了就饿，就想吃东西。他说也有其他的室友有相似的抱怨。有个女生房间在那两个人的房间的正下面，每次那女的哭，她都听得一清二楚，好害怕。我提议直接赶他们走，因为料想他们是不会改的。室友说还是给他们次机会，但那个男的必须不再来我 们家。基本上，我认为，那男的来我家，只为三件事：食物，睡觉，和性。

那几封email到现在好几个星期了。那男的依然常来我们家。偷吃东西的情况有所改善，但吵架，骂人，和哭声，依然上演。而且新的状况出现了。

上次星期一天晚上一点半，正睡着觉呢，屋外一阵嘈杂，不知道发生什么了。接着我房门突然被拉开，一支强力手电照进来。我靠这是派出所查房还是干嘛啊？吓得我屁滚尿流，一跳下床，拎了裤子就往腿上套，并急推旁边的姘头：“快起来快起来，完了完了，派出所查房了。我老婆知道就死定了！”裤子正套到一半——停！等 下！我这在我自己家啊，一个人睡觉啊！手电开口了，说是救护车，有个女的服了什么药物。我这次连屁眼都没用，就知道，若不是救护车走错地址了，就肯定是那 女的。然后，每个房间的人都被手电照一遍。大家一起爬起来。手电说是不是在浴室。浴缸的帘子是拉着的。我心一沉，别告诉我，帘子一拉开，电影镜头上演啊！ 整撞房子都搜遍了也找不到她人。我心又“格登”一下，低声跟那个签合同的室友说：“别告诉我最后找不到她，然后第二天找到一具……”后来终于联系到她，在 附近一条街上。救护车把她接过来，然后再带上那男的，一起送到医院。操，这都TMD是些什么狗屁事啊？

这两天，她房门不知道怎么又被他们搞烂了。今天我出门前，那女的唉哟个不停，一直呕吐。我在想，靠，丫不是有了吧？就这两个人的德性，还配生孩子了？当然，他们大概也只配生孩子了，因为繁衍是任何物种都能做得到的。

这个女人的故事，暂时到此为止。所有人，包括读者你，大概都会问：为什么她不离开那个男的？我会告诉你，人从来都是害怕改变的。哪怕一种不同的生活方式再美好， 当自己没有真正经历过时，都不可能能了解它有多好。而失去更好的生活方式，人们并不会感到后悔，因为人们并不知道自己失去了什么。哪怕现在的生活再坏，因为自己已经经历过了，并依然生存着，好也罢歹也罢，就会得过且过的期盼明天一切都会变好。所有 人都会认为她离开那个男人，会过上更好的生活。可身在其中的她，却看不到这个事实。

这里，可能又以中国人为更甚。相对西方家庭，中国家庭的离婚率比较低。这是因为中国家庭更幸福？中国家庭的离婚率在早些年更低，但随着改革开放，这些年离婚率不断上升。这是因为改革开放让中国家庭变得不幸福了？我不是研究社会学的。但我知道，比起西方人，中国人更能凑合和将就。有时候，人们会用种种的借口， 比如为了孩子，为了和他（她）曾经美好的过去，为了共同拥有的多少年的回忆，等等。可是，事情的真相是，人们对于已经到了手的过去，会抓住不放。

有些人以为是在抓住属于自己的东西。他们认为那是他们自己选择的，所以自己一定会像自己期盼那样变的幸福。可实际上，他们自己选择的“幸福”，是建立在一个事实上——他们把自己所有期望寄托在别人身上。他们寄望别人会变好，别人会对自己好，别人会让自己的生活变美好。 他们努力去抓住的，只不过是已腐朽并将腐烂的过去。因为自己已经习惯了这样的腐朽，习惯了这样陷在里面，于是认为这就是属于自己的生活。他们懒到根本不愿意去想象自己会过另外一种生活，更不敢去尝试。那个副教授是这样，那个女的是这样，你我也可能是这样。因为这样的尝试，会给自己已有的生活带来巨大的振动；有时候需要付出很大的代价；更重要的，是自己在思想上，必须有极大的扭转。所以，大家都这么得过且过着，守株待兔般等着好生活找上门来。他们忘记了一件事，只有自己才能创造自己的生活。

甚至于有些人，美好的生活找上门了，他们却害怕，恐惧，并选择逃避。因为那不是他们熟悉的生活，他们不敢确定那有多美好，尤其是在要放弃自己目前生活的前提下。 难道不能理解么？若不真的能放下包袱，做一些尝试和体验，有谁能肯定它是好还是坏呢？有谁知道，若它是坏的，自己还能不能回到自己原来那个，哪怕并不完全好但也不至于让人活不下去的生活呢？

这又回到之前的问题了。他们过于习惯陷在过去的腐朽里。他们对不可测的明天没有任何掌控感。他们没有任何自信自己能完全不依靠腐朽的过去，创造一个美好的明天。

有什么必要一定得回到过去呢？过去的生活已经过去了。不管是好是坏，它只能用来缅怀。只有明天才是最美好的。无论你的过去怎样，甚至不管你今天怎样，只要一觉醒来，又是一个崭新的明天，又可以斗志满满的为了创造自己的美好生活而战斗。这才是生活的意义；这才是生活的乐趣所在；这才是人类进步的源泉；这才是人和很多其他物种可以不同的地方。

并不是所有人都有学科学必备的素质之一——不畏失败，敢于尝试，勇于发现新事物。我想说，事实上大多数人有，至少是有过——还是小孩的时候。可是人造的社会和环境让长大的人们“成熟”了。

话说回来，任何人都有选择自己生活的自由。谁都没有权利指责别人的生活。谁也不知道此刻的选择，对未来的生活有什么，或多大的影响。我也可能是“他们”中的一个。我自己，也不知道我现在选择的生活就一定是正确还是错误。——实际上，根本没有什么对与错一说。因为我知道，我现在做的事，是我自己从内心喜欢做的事。

什么是“自己从内心喜欢做的事”？做生意赚很多的钱，有很多的房产汽车，天天吃好的穿好的，有很多女人（或男人），就是“自己从内心喜欢做的事”？（实际上，天天吃好的，和有很多女人，是我要从中剔除的。因为它们根本上是物种的生存和繁衍，是基因决定的，是每个物种都想做到的。）它们都是这个人造的社会， 加在人们身上的种种压力。如果脱离了这个社会环境，它们根本没有任何意义。

什么才是“自己从内心喜欢做的事”？它不应该来自任何别人或环境的压力。只有这样的事，在做起来才能体会到从内心发自的快乐。如果你不知道对你来说，它是什么，那么花些时间，哪怕是很长的时间，坐下来静静的回想下目前为止自己的一生，认真的想想，什么事，什么时刻，你曾放下包袱，轻松的，自然的，发自内心的，脱离社会压力的快乐过。如果你知道它是什么，那么就别畏惧，别逃避，正视它，直面它，迎上去，努力抓住它，哪怕它可能给你现在的生活带来巨大的改变。最可悲的，莫过于明明知 道了它是什么，甚至体验了，却被现实生活胆怯了自己的勇气。一但擦肩而过，便永远失去了。

最后，引用“Star Trek”（《星际迷航》）里的一句话结束本文：to boldly go where no one has gone before。 勇敢吧，创造我们美好的明天！

大早，突然惊醒！！屁股上一下钻心刺痛，激得我几乎平的跳起来！竟不知道我早年修炼过旱地拔葱，鲤鱼打挺。猛一挣扎，掀开被子。。。。。。晕啊！一只3cm长的黑色黄蜂幽幽飞出来！它。。。它。。。它是从哪来的？！我睡觉门窗关得死死的——免得被劫色，被子也捂得严严的——免得春光四射。而且喔~~这是第三次了！

屁股上刺痛顶得热血一下涌起脑子，人一下就失去理智了。从垃圾篓里翻了个牙膏盒子，口里喊着“fuck”手里一下一下的戳过去，就像个骄傲的中世纪十字军。花开两朵各表一枝，插播笑话一个。知道为什么十字军会灭亡吧？因为他们都放个十字在身上。话说我戳了半天戳不到，疯了般冲到厨房拿喷蚊子的，又疯了般冲回来，在几个箱子之间再次找到它。往死里对着它喷，直到它周围浸满了药水。我方停下来，大口喘气，盯着它看。

它浸满药水湿嗒嗒的身体在一滩药水中，翻滚，挣扎，扭曲。我屏住呼吸，瞪暴了双眼，死死盯着它——它继续翻滚着，挣扎着，扭曲着——直到它终于一动不动。我这才又开始大口喘气。

知道什么叫罪行吧？现在你看到了。多么像人类历史上一直都有的疯狂的复仇和战争。我很少杀其他生命形式——人类没有权利侵犯它们，除非它侵犯了我——学生态的就是这样的了。可是我在人自身生理系统的控制下，也是完全不能自控。

我仿佛见到一个小小的灵魂从那躯体中升起，化作无数的黄蜂，齐向我刺来。我闭上眼，黑影依然在我心头缭绕。

躺在床上，强迫自己睡着。突然一连串急急振翅之声从我面前掠过。我浑身一个激灵，瞪死了双眼！！——1只苍蝇。

前段时间，学校里健身房搞个铁人比赛。三个项目，1分钟俯卧撑，1分钟仰卧起坐，和20公斤靠墙蹲。我耍了个小诡计，因为在那一天是随时都可参加的，于是我等到晚上关门前不久才去，这样我可以知道人家的成绩。最后我以，110个俯卧撑，74个仰卧起坐，8分钟负重蹲，得了第一。比第二名总积分只高一分。想想一分钟110个俯卧撑有点吓人，我以前最多一次是高三做了90个还是不限时的。其实并没什么，因为光顾速度，并不完全标准。不管怎么说，奖品还不错，半年的健身卡，大概值1000多RMB。

知道我拿奖品的时候想什么吧？——“没人敢说我们是东亚病夫了吧？”我刚这么想完，我就不停的自责。我一这么想，岂不是默认自己是了？！

回到家，跟一起住的北京的汤哲说我赢了比赛。知道他第一句说什么吧？——“好啊，我们脱离东亚病夫了。”

我无语~~！！

我想，大概再也没有有哪国会轻易向有核武器的中国发动战争。可是，清末前后那段时期的遗毒已扎根于每个中国人的心里。我相信，如果说连我这样思想先进的人都能被它毒化的话，没有几个中国人能彻底不被影响。

中国的社会既有密集人口社会所有的缺点，也有非密集人口社会所有的缺点，但却没有非密集人口社会所有的优点。中国人守旧，迂腐，没有创造力，目光短浅，看到人家一个优点了就铆起来跟从(注1)。我不知道活在以前被肉体强暴和现在被精神强暴双重阴影之下(注2)的中国的未来的路将指向何方。

我讨厌政治，也不想谈及政治。但是没有政治，我将怎样改变拥有这样多人口的一个国家？

注1：这实际上是社会主义国家共同的一个缺点，也体现了社会主义国家的人民的无知和被盲目。例如，（1）新中国成立后的全国大炼钢，（2）前苏联的全国大种棉花。  

注2：以前被侵略，现在盲目学人家发展经济。

3. Trends of shrinkage

The shrinkage of the Aral Sea is so remarkably visible, even from space (Glantz 1998). The great retreat of east and south shores had caused the join of former isolated islands to the mainland (Figure 2) and the division of the Aral Sea since 1989 into Small Aral, or north sea, and Larger Aral, or south sea (Orlova 1999). In some area former coastal villages now are sitting more than 100 km from the Aral Sea (Figure 1, Micklin 1997 and Tsukatani 1998). From Figure 2, the Aral is highly likely to further divide into three parts if it continues shrinking. 

In 1960, the Aral Sea was 53.41 m in depth, 68,000 km² in surface area and 1,090 km³ in the total volume of water (Micklin 1997). Since 1960 it has been disappearing at a dramatic rate. Nowadays, its sea level has dropped at least 20 m (Wolff 1996 and Figure3) and lost 58% of area and 83% of water (Miller 2005 and Figure 3). The only thing increasing is its salinity which went up from 10g/L in 1960 to 35g/L in 2000 (Micklin 1997 and Figure 3).

       1960                             1971                            1976                              1994

(Modified from Micklin 1997)

      The Aral Sea in 2004 

(Modified from picture made by de:Benutzer:Sansculotte 2004)

Figure 2. The shrinking surface area of the Aral Sea.

(From FAO/AGL 2005)

Figure 3. Trends of the Aral Sea.

4. Causes

4.1 Overuse of water

4.1.1 Large water demand

The direct reason causing the desiccation of the Aral Sea is the huge withdrawal of water from the two feeder rivers, Syr and Amu Rivers (Miller 2005).

In 1987, Syr and Amu provided 132.1 km³ water 73.7% of which, 97.3 km³, was diverted to meet the human demand, majority for agriculture (Table 1). Nevertheless, 97.3 km³ of water withdrawal was even the result after the efficiency of irrigation systems had been improved (Micklin 1997).

4.1.2 Negative net gain

Seemingly, there is still more than 30 km³ of water remaining to feed the Aral Sea. Unfortunately, it is not the case because it is remarkably counteracted by the great evaporation. From 1960 to 1985, the river flow decreased by two third and precipitation also fell due to the climate change (Micklin 1997 and Table 2). Thus, the net gain of water for the Aral Sea has been negative and kept increasing since 1960, causing the desiccation (Table 2).

Table 2. Average annual water balances for the Aral Sea, 1926 to 1985.

(From Micklin 1997)

Theoretically, a body of water is capable to resist the shrinkage. As it shrinks, the decreasing surface area should cause the reduction of evaporation. However, the Aral Sea will slow down shrinking only when it is much smaller in size because the output of it, evaporation, is far greater than the inflow. (Micklin 1997)

4.2 Water for irrigation

4.2.1 Irrigation in the Aral Sea Basin

Water of Syr and Amu has been used for irrigation for thousands years in the Aral Sea Basin. Although the irrigation area in the studied region went up from 3 million hectares in 1900 to 5 million hectares in 1960, the sea level remained in equilibrium and even in “high phase”, thanks to the compensation of reduced evaporation, transpiration and filtration and the installation of drainage networks. (Micklin 1997)

Things have changed since 1960. The irrigated area in the Aral Sea region increased to 6.5 million hectares in 1980 and then to 7.6 million hectares in 1987, and correspondingly the population nearly tripled during 35 years (Micklin 1997 and Figure 4). 120 km³ water was diverted in 1980 and 91% was used for irrigation (Micklin 1997 and Figure 4). The slight decrease of water consumption in Figure since 1980 is due to a major gain of irrigation efficiency (Micklin 1997).

(From FAO/AGL 2005)

Figure 4. The evolution of population, irrigation area and water withdrawal in the Aral Sea Basin.

4.2.2 Cotton

If the Aral Sea disaster could be concluded in one word, that is “cotton” (Tsukatani 1998).

Cotton is one of the most important crops in the world because of its clean and high quality fiber (Tsukatani 1998). To rival with the US, the former Soviet Union government had coveted the Syr and Amu river for a long time in order to irrigate the desert in the Aral Sea region and thus to grow cotton that was seen as “white gold” (Pearce 2006 and Tsukatani 1998).

As Moscow wanted more cotton, the irrigation area more than doubled between 1965 and 1980. By the 1980s, cotton growth covered 85% of all the fields in the Aral region, which is termed a monocrop. (Pearce 2006)

Despite the desert was flushed with a huge amount of water in order to grow crops, typically cotton, monocropping heavily depended on the application of fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides and defoliants, which caused heavy pollution, and was not resistant to severe climate, which implied a yield reduction as the climate worsened. (Glantz 1998 and Micklin 1997)

4.2.3 Poorly built irrigation systems

Large scale irrigation canals were employed to divert water. Nevertheless, many of them were poorly built and the water was left leaking out, seeping into soil or evaporating. (Pearce 2006, Tsukatani 1998 and Micklin 1997)

Moreover, there was no means of implemental new irrigation technology. In the former Soviet Union, more than 60% of 19 million hectares of total irrigated area were unequipped with sprinklers (Tsukatani 1998). In most cases, the channels leading water along fields were done manually with shovels and hoes (Tsukatani 1998). As a result, 40% of water was squandered (Pearce 2006).

Even today, the irrigation systems in the Aral Sea Basin are still poor. Most of them are the legacy of former USSR. After the trip in the Aral Sea Basin, Fred Pearce stated in his 2006 book that

“…broken water channels leaked their water into the ground…Maintenance of the irrigation network has largely broken down since the Russians left…The water is smeared across the desert, evaporating in the sun…Canals leak. Sluice gates are broken. Drainage ditches are silted up and filled with weeds.” (Pearce 2006, pp. 206-208)

4.2.4 Irrational use of water

4.2.4.1 Hyper-consumption

Water is used to flush the desert before growing crop to combat the aridness (Pearce 2006). The specific consumption of water in some area of the Basin is 3-3.5 times as much as that of other countries (Willardson 1996).

4.2.4.2 Salinization and the Aral way to avoid it

After being used for irrigation, water penetrates into underground and lifts up the water table, then dissolves the salts in the soils and brings them to surface, which caused salinization, a common problem faced by all the irrigated land around the world. (Pearce 2006)

In the Aral Sea Basin, the only way to remove those salts in top soils is simply using more water to wash them. Consequently, more water brings more salts to surface which will be washed using much more water. (Pearce 2006)

4.3 Naive confidence

Following the Lenin’s lecture in 1921, “irrigation will do more than anything else to revive the area, bury the past, and make the transition to socialism more certain” (Pearce 2006, p 203), and the belief of trade-off, 1m³ of water was much worthier irrigating crop than delivered to the Aral (Micklin 1997), experts and decision makers foresaw the desiccation of the Sea but none of the impacts (Micklin 1997). In spite of the ignorance of the climate impact, they believed as the Aral Sea shrank the salts would deposit on the sea bed and were of low toxicity, and would eventually form a durable crust (Micklin 1997). Some optimists even suggested growing cotton on the dried former sea bottom (Pearce 2006 and Micklin 1997).

The chilling truth is, to Moscow the shrinkage of the Aral was neither surprising nor accidental but destined. Soviet engineers have ever drawn a series of maps which describe the planned gradual death of the Aral Sea and its disappearance by 2000. (Pearce 2006)

5. Environmental degradations and impacts

5.1 The exposed seabed and the salt/dust storms

It was estimated there was 10 billion metric tons of salt in the Aral Sea in 1960, mainly consisting of NaCl (56%), MgSO4 (26%) and CaSO4 (15%) [1]. As the Aral Sea shrank, part of the salt remained dissolved in water leading to the increase of salinity and the rest was left on the beach that was actually the former sea bed. As vast area of sea bottom exposed, it became the Aralkum, the new-formed white desert covered by salts. (Tsukatani 1998 and Sultangazin 1998)

Every year about 40 million metric tons of salt are lifted up from the Aralkum to the atmosphere and eventually drops on land. The salt storms mainly affect 100-km-wide and 500-km-long area along the Aralkum. Traces of the salt were even detected 1000 km away from the Aral Sea. (Micklin 1997)

The salt storms attack the Aral Sea area 55 days per year on average (Pearce 2006) and destroy everything. The habitat of fauna and flora was lost; the agricultural yield was reduced; the water quality deteriorated. These problems will be discussed respectively later.

5.2 Deterioration of deltaic ecosystems

The rivers become dry and the area is salinized (Micklin 1997). As a result, deltaic ecosystems have suffered an irreversible damage (Glantz 1998). As over 85% of the wetland disappears, the bio-richness of the 2700-square-mile delta along the two rivers has gone (Orlova 1999, Micklin 1997, Pearce 2006 and Miller 2005). Many local plant communities disappeared and correspondingly native animals died and migrant birds no longer came (Simon 1995 and Micklin 1997). 178 animal species was recorded before 1960 but only 38 of them survived now (Simon 1995).

In addition, the combination of the vegetational degradation and the depression of water table due to over-withdrawal of water have turned the former fertile delta to sterile desert. (Micklin 1997)

5.3 Climate changes

Thanks to the great specific heat of water, a huge body of water can remarkably moderate the local climate. This is the reason a coastal city has low daily temperature change.

The Aral Sea now has essentially lost the ability of moderating the climate. Consequently, the regional climate has become more continental. Now summers have become hotter, shorter and no rain, whereas winters are colder, longer and no snow. These lead to less precipitation and lower humidity, making the Aral area drier and fastening the desertification. (Micklin 1997)   

As the main theme of the Aral project, Moscow’s cotton industry had suffered a large loss because the yield was reduced and cotton planting in many areas was forced to change to other crops growing, such as rice, due to the shortening of the growing season. (Micklin 1997)

5.4 Water supply and health concerns

5.4.1 Drinking water problem

As salty dust storms envelop the Aral Sea area, the salts drop everywhere. Moreover, tons of fertilizer, pesticide, herbicide and defoliant, including Agent Orange (Simon 1995), were dumped on the land to overcome the poor fertility of the desert soil and to increase the yield (Glantz 1998). Salts and chemicals found their way via the flushing water, penetrating into deep soil and contaminating the groundwater, or draining back to the river and later being brought to the Sea (Micklin 1997, Glantz 1998 and Pearce 2006).

There is nowhere to escape (Pearce 2006). The entire region is “poisoned”. The contaminants are in drinking water, in vegetables (Pearce 2006), in tea that is able to make the milk curdle immediately (Pearce 2006), and even in mothers’ milk (Glantz 1998).

5.4.2 Human health deterioration

People will become aware when their welfare is threatened. Unfortunately, people’s health condition has been alarmingly affected on an extensive scale. There was a sharp increase in anemia, gastro-intestinal illnesses, throat cancer, typhoid, viral hepatitis, epidemics, and so on. (Micklin 1997 and Glantz 1998)

The health situations of two districts in Uzbekistan were compared. The prevalence of sickness in the district closer to the Aral was statistically higher than that of the other one. (Chiba et al. 2003)

Women and children are especially vulnerable to diseases. In some region, 97% of women have anemia and 87% of babies are born with congenital anemia (Pearce 2006).

As an important indicator to measure the maturity of a society, infant mortality is extraordinarily high. Turkmenistan underwent a mortality of 54.74/1000 in 1989 (Tsukatani 1998). The situation was even worse in Uzbekistan. It was reported that 11% of all babies born in the Karakalpak republic of Uzbekistan died under one year old (Tsukatani 1998).

5.5 Economic losses

According to Micklin 1997, economically 1.5 to 2 billion rubles (one ruble is about $1.60) were lost for the whole Aral Sea area due to its degradation, contributing as following: agriculture, 42%; fisheries, 31%; commercial hunting and trapping, 13%; navigation and transport, 8%; and human welfare, 6%. (Micklin 1997)

5.5.1 Agriculture

On nearly one third of all agricultural land in the studied region it is estimated 20%-50% of yield is robbed due to the climate change and serious salinization (Miller 2005). 

5.5.2 Fisheries and canneries

As the Aral Sea has salinized and a great amount of chemical pollutants, including fertilizer, pesticide, herbicide, defoliant and even bio-weapon material, has drained into it, it was not suitable for fish to living, leading to the irreversible disappear of fisheries (Glantz 1998). The commercial fishery harvest dropped from 43,430 metric tons in 1960 to 17,400 tons in 1970 (Glantz 1998). By 1980’ 20 out of 24 local fish species have been extinct and the commercial catch has been zero (Micklin 1997), and more than 60,000 people lost their jobs (Miller 2005 and Micklin 1997).

As a result, the fish canneries stopped running and also increase the unemployment rate. Some major canneries now are located some distance from the Sea and lack raw material to manufacture fish cans. Although a few canneries are still processing fish now, the fish is not from the Aral Sea but from Atlantic, Pacific or Arctic oceans, without concerns of cost. (Micklin 1997)

5.5.3 Commercial hunting and trapping

It is not surprising the commercial hunting and trapping have the same fate with fisheries. Animals died or migrated (such as migrant birds) due to loss of habitats. Hence, commercial hunting and trapping almost disappeared. For instance, the yield of muskrat skins in Amu delta reduced from 650,000 in 1960 to only 2,500 per year. (Micklin 1997)

5.5.4 Livestock raising

Another consequence of the deltaic deterioration is the loss of hayfields and pastures. As a result of the disappearance of 81% hayfields and pastures area in Amu delta 1960-1980, the yield of livestock reduced by more than half. (Micklin 1997)

5.5.5 Navigation and transportation

People no longer navigate and transport on the Sea and Amu and Syr because the water of the Sea retreats hundreds miles from former ports and the two river are dried (Micklin 1997). Thus, a lot of so-called “ghost ships” and “ghost harbors” were abandoned (Figure 5).

(Photos Staecker 2003)

Figure 5. Stranded ship in former Aral Sea near Aral Kazakhstan (left) and a former harbor in the city of Aral Kazakhstan (right).

6. Discussion

6.1 Possible solutions

There are no perfect solutions so far. If there are, the disaster will not continue.

6.1.1 Improving the irrigation efficiency

As the vast majority of water consumption is agricultural, increasing the efficiency of irrigation systems can effectively save water. In the early 1980s, on average the irrigation efficiency was around only 60% and the water consumption on irrigation was 120 km³ throughout the studied area (Micklin 1997). In 1987, they improved respectively to 70% and 104 km³ (Micklin 1997). The real water use remained roughly same (120×60%≈104×70%), but 16 km³ of water was saved.

However, the efficiency of water use can not increase infinitely.

6.1.2 The best or worst ideas

There are also some radical solutions thought to solve the problem at one time. One is to channel the waters of Siberian rivers such as Ob, Irtysh and Yenisey to refill the Aral Sea in 20-30 years period with a estimated cost of $50 billion (Tsukatani 1998). Another idea is using nuclear explosions to melt the glacier of the Pamir and Tian Shan from which Syr and Amu are derived (Tsukatani 1998). These solutions just like that USSR decided to extract the water from Syr and Amu for irrigation, only see the aspect that people want. The things people think under control are far from controllable. Again, “you cannot do just one thing” (Miller 2005, p 316). Anyway, such suggestions are certain to survive (Tsukatani 1998).

6.1.3 Other solutions

Other solutions include afforestation (Koksharova and Isakov 1985), changing different crops (Ramazanov and Nasonov 1991), and so on. However, so far as the water keeps being diverted from the rivers feeding the Aral on a large scale, the problem can not be solved. As irrigated lands contribute more than 90% of agricultural harvest in the studied area, it is very hard to restore the Sea even at 1987 size, 41,000 km² or 60% of the size before 1960 (Figure 3) because this requires river inflow of 30 km³ per year (Micklin 1997).

6.2 CEPs

Those chronically cumulative problems, such as the Aral Sea, global warming and ozone depletion, are called creeping environmental problems (CEPs). Its one major feature is that the situation does not make a big difference from day to day. This could be one explanation of how could the Aral Sea disaster still last after half century. The long-term and slow-onset characteristics make a business-as-usual attitude to people. (Glantz 1998)

It is critically important to identify thresholds of CEPs which “suddenly” emerge as results of successive and cumulative degradations. As artificial changing points, thresholds function as identifying the degree of degradation for specialists and raising the awareness for people. For example, the sharp reduction of fisheries to zero in the Aral area was one visible threshold to warn decision makers and people. (Glantz 1998)

6.3 Irrigation in Australia

6.3.1 Murray-Darling Basin

6.3.1.1 Importance to Australia

The Murray-Darling Basin covers 1/7 of total area of Australia and produces 1/3 of Australian agricultural output. It has of the whole country 1/4 cattle and dairy faims, 1/2 of sheep, lambs and crop land, and almost 90% of the irrigated land. Every year the production is worth $10 billion. (Pigram et al. 1992)

6.3.1.2 Degradation

Although the identification of thresholds is not available, it is undoubted the Murray-Darling Basin has been being degraded. A 1987 estimation believed each year more than $220 million was lost due to resource degradation, water quality deterioration, lifting groundwater level and disappearance of native flora and fauna in the whole basin. (Pigram et al. 1992)

6.3.1.3 Concerns of no threshold

The biggest worry for the Murray-Darling regional degradation is no threshold has been identified. This could be explained as the environmental degradation and deterioration in the Murray-Darling Basin is not that serious. Nevertheless, another likely reason is that the real situation is covered or undiscovered.

Since 1965 Moscow had demanded much more cotton and decided further expanding irrigative area (Pearce 2006), the Aral Sea Basin had been irreversibly degraded. However, about 10 years later, salty dust storms, probably the first threshold, grabs the attention of USSR government when some photographs of storms were sent back from their spaceship (Glantz 1998). Another 10 years later, the Aral Sea crisis was then first known to the world (Glantz 1998).

Thus, there is a delay, usually a long delay, from CEPs happening to being known to people. Information reaches people usually after having passed a route: the first discoverer, local officials or environmental researchers, local media, national decision-making level and international media (here, the threshold plays the role showing a certain degree of the seriousness of the problem with a certain time). That means when a CEP is uncovered to people its impacts have been so severe as visible and perceptible, and often much larger and more serious than people expect. (Glantz 1998)

6. 4 “You cannot do just one thing” (Miller 2005, p 316)

The Aral Sea disaster would not happen, if USSR had not had so blind faith following the instructions of several particular leaders; if Moscow had not seen nothing but cotton and money; if more scientists could see the Aral Sea’s fate with more concerns but less optimism; if policy makers could think more about the warnings from those cautious scientists; if the water was used for irrigation carefully as before 1960; if efficient irrigation systems had been installed; if fertilizer, pesticide, herbicide and defoliant had been applied rationally with a sense of sustainability; if people knew water resource, especially unpolluted freshwater resource, was limited and precious; if people knew they could not do just one thing……

7. Conclusion

A poor decision made by USSR government in the early 20^th century has torturing people living in the Aral Sea Basin almost half century. Moscow had enjoyed the splendid cotton harvest and export income in the first ten years after the river water diversion programme was embarked in 1960. Since then Moscow saw the Sea’s shrinkage and the environmental deterioration and however thought those are in plan and control. When the disaster was first exposed to the world in 1986, the Aral Sea environment had already been irreversibly damaged. After former Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, the Central Asian Publics and their people have taken the burden and legacy left by USSR. (Micklin 1997, Glantz 1998 and Tsukatani 1998)

Economically, the loss people suffered much far exceeds the money gained from cotton. Due to extensive degradation, not only the yields of cotton and other crops and livestock have reduced, the traditional fisheries, hunting and trapping, and transportation have disappeared. (Micklin 1997)

In spite of money, people’s living and working environments also have deteriorated. As a result of highly mineralized and polluted drinking water, people have suffered various diseases in a long term and large extension (Micklin 1997). There is patient in every family (Pearce 2006).

Many co-operations and efforts have been done by national and international officials or organizations (Tsukatani 1998). And many suggestions have been carried out or posed, but, probably, people are not able to change their fates as far as they do not have the courage to give up the life totally depending on cotton and agriculture. “Taking a new step…is what people fear most” (Hoffer 1952, quoted by Glantz 1998).

Listen a voice from the prime minister of Uzbekistan in 1938 who was executed very soon later, “you cannot eat cotton” (Pearce 2006, p 203), and another voice from a local person in the Aral Sea Basin in the 21^st century, “we don’t need cotton” (Pearce 2006, p 213).

The Aral Sea is the most expensive and painful lesson to human.

8. Acknowledgement

The outline of this paper was generally based on the structure of Micklin 1997.

9. References

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